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ANTHROPOLOGY

INCLUSIVE FITNESS AND THE PRACTICE OF POLYANDRY
AMONG THE SKIDI PAWNEE

Thomas E. McGinnis
Nebraska State Historical Society
1500 R Street
Lincoln, Nebraska 68508

discussion of traditional theories of polyandry, Berte (1977)
divided the anthropological discussions of polyandry into the
following three basic types:

The ethnohistorical record of the practice of polyandry among
the Skidi Pawnee of the 19th century is examined from the perspective
of the inclusive fitness model. The practice of temporary polyandry
may have allowed males to maximize their inclusive fitness by insuring
high paternity certainty. Younger brothers and nephews may have
guarded the wives of older male relatives to prevent the wives from
bearing children of unrelated males.

t t

1.

Unilineal evolutionary schemes which tend to be primarily descriptive and largely speculative, and which
use polyandry as an element in their construction.

2.

Particularistic causal explanations that invoke factors,
or a combination of factors, such as sex ratio biases,
!ineality, ecological stress, economic constraints, etc.,
to explain the situational occurrence of polyandry.

3.

Structural explanations of polyandry that interpret
the phenomenon as an inherent feature of the overall
social organization of the society or family unit.

t

Temporary polyandry was practiced among the Skidi
Pawnee of the 19th century. TIle "inclusive fitness" model
(Hamilton, 1964a and 1964b) is a possible explanation for the
practice and social structure of the polyandrous mating system. Hamilton's notion of inclusive fitness is defined by Irons
(I 979: 17) as "a measure of an individual's genetic representation in descending generations. It takes into account both an
individual's own reproduction and that of relatives who share
some of the individual's genes." An individual can make a
genetic contribution to the next generation by investing in its
own offspring or in the offspring of relatives. An investment is
anything done to increase the offspring's chance of surviving
(Trivers, 1974:249). Investment in a relative's offspring is
referred to as an altruistic act. To be adaptive, the investment
or cost (C) of an altruistic act must be less than the benefit
(B) received as a result of that act. This can be expressed
mathematically as (Bs - Cs) + r (Bk - Ck) > O. "Where Bs
and Cs are the benefits and costs to self, Bk and Ck are the
benefits and cost to the related individual, and r is the coefficient of relatedness between the two individuals" (Irons,
1979 :25). For a more complete discussion of Hamilton's
inclusive fitness model, see West Eberhard (1975).

An empirical test of the inclusive fitness model as it related to Tibetan fraternal polyandrous marriages was conducted by Beall and Goldstein (1981). They concluded:
... that Tibetan fraternal polyandry does not appear
to enhance the (individual or inclusive) fitness of the
individuals who practice it and in fact seems to entail
significant reproductive sacrifice, i.e., can perpetuate
mating systems that decrease the individual and inclusive fitnesss of the individuals who practice it.
~:

This finding by Beall and Goldstein started a debate in
the anthropological literature. Abernethy's (1981) review of
Tibetan fraternal polyandry criticizes Beall and Goldstein for
using the mean number of children born instead of the mean
number of surviving children in their calculations. After substituting the mean number of surviving children, the advantage

Polyandry has been traditionally defined as the marriage
of one woman to two or more men. In a critical review and
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of monogamously married males is not as great. Abernethy
went on to state that group selection is the proper way to view
Tibetan polyandry, not individual selection.
In another review, Fernandez (1981) pointed out that in
order to test the theory of kin selection data spanning several
generations, instead of the one generation studied by Beall and
Goldstein, would be required. Fernandez also pointed out that
there are resource constraints on the size of the Tibetan population studied, and that polyandrous marriages may help to
maintain a low birth rate.
In another review of Tibetan polyandry Weigel and Taylor
(1982) stated that Beall and Goldstein used only population
statistics in their study. To test the inclusive fitness model as
it relates to polyandry, it is necessary also to have quantitative data on factors affecting individual choice. Weigel and
Taylor concluded that sociobiology may "prove to be a relatively unusable theory for human behavior because it is difficult to test," but they rejected the notion that Beall and Goldstain have demonstrated that the theory is incorrect.
In the most recent review of Beall and Goldstein's position, Fleising (1982) addressed a problem with the inclusive
fitness model. The problem centers on a reconciliation of two
views of selection. One view is that selection favors the maximization of resource utilization, and the other view is that
selection favors the optimization of reproductive fitness.
Fleising contended that there must be a merger of aspects of
optimal foraging theory and the inclusive fitness model.
These arguments are presented so the reader may be aware
of the controversy surrounding the use of the inclusive fitness
model to explain human polyandry. It is beyond the scope of
this paper to make another empirical test of this model. Within
the limits of the data available it may be useful to apply the
model to the polyandry practiced by the Skidi Pawnee.
In the 19th century the Pawnee practiced village endogamy (Dorsey, 1906:71; Lowie, 1935:90; Dorsey and Murie,
1940: 7 5, 97). However, marriage did occur outside of the village on rare occasions (Lowie, 1935:90). Chastity among
women was very important before marriage (Dorsey, 1906:73;
Dorsey and Murie, 1940:96-97) and fidelity after marriage
was of equal importance. The only reason cited for divorce
among the Pawnee was infidelity on the part of women
(Dunbar, 1880:267; Grinnell, 1891 :279; Dorsey, 1906:73;
Dorsey and Murie, 1940:101).
The Pawnee practiced levirate marriage (Grinnell, 1891:
279; Lesser, 1930:99; Dorsey and Murie, 1940:85) and sororal
polygyny (Dorsey and Murie, 1940:84). The man indicated at
the time of marriage to the oldest sister if he intended to
marry her younger sisters as well (Lesser, 1930 :99).

Pawnee kin relationships were very fluid and not at all
rigidly structured (Welt fish , 1965). A form of temporary
polyandry was sometimes entered into between brothers and
between uncles and their nephews (sister's sons) as long as
they were friends and would not become jealous (Dorsey and
Murie, 1940:85). The polyandrous relationship lasted several
years (Dorsey and Murie, 1940:85), from the time the younger
brother or nephew reached puberty until the time of his marriage to another woman. The younger brother or nephew upon
reaching puberty moved into the household of his older
brother or maternal uncle. Some Pawnee say that the older
brother would allow his younger brother to have sexual relations with his wife after he had demonstrated his bravery and
prowess on the warpath (Lesser, 1930:99). From the perspective of the male, it would appear that any polyandrous relationship constitutes an altruistic act, i.e., benefiting another
male's Darwinian fitness and decreasing his own fitness.
However, when looked at from the perspective of the inclusive
fitness model, under favorable circumstances, the very act
may improve his inclusive fitness. The Pawnee man (older
brother or maternal uncle) may in fact be improving his inclusive fitness even though he may be lowering his Darwinian.
fitness. In order for Pawnee polyandry to be adaptive (i.e.,
non-altruistic, and maximizing the inclusive fitness of the older
male), the formula (Bs - Cs) + r (Bk - Ck) > 0 (Irons, 1979:
25) must apply. In this application, Bs equals the benefit that
the older male receives in terms of inclusive fitness, i.e., passing genes to the next generation. Cs equals the cost to the
older brother or uncle in terms of Darwinian fitness. The cost
to the older male in this relationship is allowing his wife's
reproductive capacity to be utilized by his younger male
relative.
A Pawnee woman, on the average, had four children. No
birth control was practiced and the reason for the small
number of children was long lactation periods (Dunbar, 1880:
266-267).
According to Weltfish (1965), paternity determination
was biologically calculated by the Pawnee, and children with
unknown biological fathers were social outcasts. In the following passage, Weltfish (1965:17-18) related how the biological
determination was accomplished:
... The Pawnee were very literal about fatherhood.
For a child to be accepted in the community with
any decent status, its physiological father must be
known. In any given month from one menstrual
period to the next, a woman had to confine her
sexual activities to one man only, and when she was
aware through the cessation of menstruation that she
had conceived, she was required to notify the man
and point out on what occasion of intercourse together the child was conceived. The man was then
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obligated, until the child reached full maturity of
eighteen or more, to provide it with fresh meat in
whatever household it might be residing and in other
ways to be concerned with its wellbeing. A woman
who departed from this iron-clad rule was unable to
convince a man of his paternity, and her child would
then be a social outcast. ...
This passage demonstrates that certainty of paternity
was high among the Pawnee. The older male in the polyandrous relationship would know which children were his and
which were fathered by the brother or nephew.
The number of children a younger brother or nephew
might have had by an older brother's or maternal uncle's
wife is unclear. However, the following passage from Weltfish
(1965 :40) indicates that older brothers did not take responsibility for a child fathered by a younger brother:
... The chief (Leading Chief) believed that the baby
was not his own but that of his younger brother, and
when it was born he took the infant by the legs and
was about to dash its head against a tree, when
Victory Call rescued the baby ....
It would be fair to say that the cost in terms of Dar-

winian fitness to a man could be substantial if a brother
or nephew had a child by one of his wives, since a woman
might have been expected to have only four children in
her lifetime. However, because the biological father was
responsible for providing protein to his child for at least 18
years, the investment of the older male in the children of his
wife or wives that were fathered by younger brothers or
nephews would be reduced. Because the Pawnee were matrilocal (Fletcher, 1907:215; Lesser, 1979:263), all of these
children probably resided in the household of the older male.
It could be assumed that the older male probably made an
investment in the children because of their close proximity.
However, the iron-clad paternity determination probably
resulted in his investment not being as great as in the children
he had fathered.
Under the polyandrous relationship, all of the older
brother's or maternal uncle's wife's children would be related
to the older brother. If he fathered one of his wife's children,
he would be related to that child by 1/2 genetically. If one of
his wife's children was fathered by a full brother, that child
would be related to the older brother by 1/4. If a half brother
fathered one of his wife's children, it would be related to the
older brother by 1/8. Children fathered by the son of a full
sister would be related to the maternal uncle by 1/8, and
those fathered by the son of a half sister would be related to
the maternal uncle by 1/16. The offspring of an older brother's wife would always be related to the husband by 1/2 (if he

was their father) to 1/16 (if they were fathered by the son of
a half sister.
There was a possible advantage to the older male in the
polyandry practiced by the Pawnee. From early childhood, a
younger brother was taught to think of his older brother's
wife as his wife (Lesser, 1930:99 and 1979:265). Whenever
his older brother was away from the village for an extended
period, the younger brother was sent by his parents to care for
his older brother's wife. In this pattern of behavior, the younger brother may have served as a guard against other males
outside of the polyandrous relationship inseminating an older
brother's wife. According to Lesser (1981, personal communication), this was never expressed as a reason for the behavior
by the Pawnee. Whether or not the Pawnee consciously
thought of it as a reason makes little difference because it still
could have fulfilled the function of insuring that males unrelated to the brothers did not have sexual access to the wife.
As mentioned previously, Pawnee men were very guarded
about access to their wives. Sexual promiscuity in wives was a
very serious matter and a Pawnee woman could be killed for
such a transgression (Grinnell, 1891 :279).
It is now possible to write in some qualitative values to
the formula (Bs - Cs) + r (Bk - Ck) > O. Bs equals the benefits
to the older male. Bs equals guardianship of this wife while
he is away from the village to insure paternity certainty. Cs
equals the cost to the older male. Cs equals the possibility of
his wife having a child by the younger male. The coefficient of
relatedness is r and equals 1/2 (for a full brother) to 1/8 (for
the son of a half sister). Bk equals the benefit to the younger
male. Bk equals the possibility of fathering a child by the
older male's wife. Ck equals the cost to the younger male.
Ck equals providing meat to the child he may have fathered.
So the formula would read: (paternity certainty - wife have a
child by the younger male) + 1/2 to 1/8 (fathering a child providing meat to the child) > O.

Unfortunately it is not possible to quantify the values to
solve the equation.
CONCLUSION
An inclusive fitness model is offered as a possible explanation of the practice of temporary polyandry among the
Pawnee.

For the practice of polyandry to be ;tdaptive for the older
brother or uncle, he would have to be absent for long periods.
In this way, he would receive the benefits of the younger
brother's or nephew's guardianship of his wife. The model,
then, predicts long periods of absence on the part of the
males.
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There is evidence for prolonged absence on the part of
males, and this supports the model presented here. Champe
and Fenenga (1974:101,103) stated that the Pawnee were in
"a continuous state of armed aggression .... " The men were
involved in frequent raiding and war expeditions. Murie (1981:
156) stated that one war party traveled for many months
before finding a village which they attacked.
An empirical test of the inclusive fitness model is not
possible in this case due to the limitations of the data set from
the ethnohistorical literature. In order to test the inclusive
fitness model empirically, one would need to know the frequency of polyandrous marriage, the number of children the
younger males fathered from the older male's wives, the set-up
and dissolution procedures of polyandrous marriage, and the
extent to which socio-economic factors influenced the practice
of polyandry. It would also be useful to know how many
wives the older male had before he entered into a polyandrous
marriage, and if the polyandrous marriage was extended to all
of his wives or just to one wife. Demographic information
about the Pawnee would also be necessary for an empirical
test of the inclusive fitness model.
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